| bankruptcyGameValue {CoopGame} | R Documentation |
Compute value of a coalition for a bankruptcy game
Description
Coalition value for a specified bankruptcy game:
For further information see bankruptcyGame
Usage
bankruptcyGameValue(S, d, E)
Arguments
S |
numeric vector with coalition of players |
d |
numeric vector which contains the claims of each player in a bankruptcy game |
E |
is the value of the estate in a bankruptcy game |
Value
A positive value if the sum of the claims outside of coalition S is less than E
else 0
Author(s)
Jochen Staudacher jochen.staudacher@hs-kempten.de
References
O'Neill, B. (1982) "A problem of rights arbitration from the Talmud", Mathematical Social Sciences 4(2), pp. 345 – 371
Aumann R.J. and Maschler M. (1985) "Game Theoretic Analysis of a Bankruptcy Problem from the Talmud", Journal of Economic Theory 36(1), pp. 195 – 213
Aumann R.J. (2002) "Game Theory in the Talmud", Research Bulletin Series on Jewish Law and Economics, 12 pages.
Gura E. and Maschler M. (2008) Insights into Game Theory, Cambridge University Press, pp. 166–204
Examples
library(CoopGame)
bankruptcyGameValue(S=c(2,3),d=c(1,2,3),E=4)
#Estate division problem from Babylonian Talmud
#from paper by Aumann (2002) with E=300
library(CoopGame)
bankruptcyGameValue(S=c(2,3),d=c(100,200,300),E=300)
#Output
#[1] 200