Inventory Models {Inventorymodel}

Inventory Models

Description

This package allows the determination of the optimal policy in terms of the number of orders to apply in the most common inventory problems. Moreover, game-theoretic procedures to share the costs of these situations have been considered by proposing allocations for the involved agents.

Details

Package:	Inventorymodel
Type:	Package
Version:	1.0
Date:	2017-04-05
License:	--

This package incorporates the functions EOQ and EOQcoo, which compute the optimal policy in an EOQ model. For studying the optimal orders and costs in an EPQ model, functions EPQ and EPQcoo can be used. The package includes the function SOC for the SOC allocation rule. For the inventory transportation system (STI), the functions STI, STIcoo and reglalineacoalitional implement the associated games to these situations and their allocation rule (line rule). The function mfoc calculates the optimal order and its associated cost to model with fixed order cost (MFOC). Shapley value can be obtained for this class of games with the function shapley\_mfoc. The basic EOQ system without holding costs and with transportation cost (MCT) can be studied with the functions mct and twolines (allocation rule). This package includes the function mwhc for models without holding costs (MWHC), the function mwhc2c when two suppliers are considered with differents costs of the product and the function mwhcct when the transportation costs are considered (MWHCCT).

Author(s)

Saavedra-Nieves, Alejandro

Maintainer: Alejandro Saavedra-Nieves <[e-mail]>

References

M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro, I. García–Jurado, A. Meca, M. A. Mosquera (2011). Cooperative game theory and inventory management. European Journal of Operational Research, 210(3), 459–466.

M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro, I. García-Jurado, A. Meca, M. A. Mosquera (2012). Cost allocation in inventory transportation systems. Top, 20(2), 397–410.

M.G.~ Fiestras-Janeiro, I.~ García-Jurado, A.~Meca, M. A. ~Mosquera (2014). Centralized inventory in a farming community. Journal of Business Economics, 84(7), 983–997.

M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro, I. García-Jurado, A. Meca, M.A. Mosquera (2015). Cooperation on capacitated inventory situations with fixed holding costs. emphEuropean Journal of Operational Research, 241(3), 719–726.

A. Meca (2007). A core-allocation family for generalized holding cost games. Mathematical Methods of Operation Research, 65, 499–517.

A. Meca, I. Garc\'ia-Jurado, P. Borm (2003). Cooperation and competition in inventory games. Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 57(3), 481–493.

A. Meca, J. Timmer, I. García-Jurado, P. Borm (1999). Inventory games. Discussion paper, 9953, Tilburg University.

A. Meca, J. Timmer, I. García-Jurado, P. Borm (2004). Inventory games. European Journal of Operational Research, 156(1), 127–139.

M.A. Mosquera, I. García-Jurado, M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro (2008). A note on coalitional manipulation and centralized inventory management. Annals of Operations Research, 158(1). 183–188.

A. Saavedra-Nieves, I. García-Jurado, M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro (2017a). Placing joint orders when holding costs are negligible and shortages are not allowed. Game Theory in Management Accounting: Implementing Incentives and Fairness (to appear).

A. Saavedra-Nieves, I. García-Jurado, M.G. Fiestras-Janeiro (2017b). On coalition formation in a non-convex multi-agent inventory problem. Submitted in Annals of Operations Research.