type {EpistemicGameTheory}

Finding types that express common belief in rationality for optimal choices

Description

This function takes the reduced payoff matrices and finds out the probabilities for the types that expresses common belief in rationality for optimal choices.

Usage

type(A, B, choices.A, choices.B)

Arguments

A

an nxm matrix representing the reduced payoff matrix of player 1

B

an nxm matrix representing the reduced payoff matrix of player 2

choices.A

a vector of length n representing the names of player 1's choices

choices.B

a vector of length m representing the names of player 2's choices

Details

This function works for the games with two players. It returns infeasible solution for the irrational choices.

Value

Probabilities of the types that expresses common belief in rationality for optimal choices

Author(s)

Bilge Baser

See Also

lp

Examples

Ar=matrix(c(0,3,2,4,0,2,4,3,0),3,3)
choices.Ar=c("Blue","Green","Red")
Br=matrix(c(5,4,4,3,5,3,2,2,5),3,3)
choices.Br=c("Blue","Green","Red")
type(Ar,Br,choices.Ar,choices.Br)